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NEGOTIABILITY, PROPERTY, AND IDENTITY·
James Steven Rogers··
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECURITIES TRANSFERS
The past few decades have seen major changes in securities trans-
fer practices. The litany is by now familiar: the "paper crunch" of the
late 19608, uncertificated securities, the central depository system,
book entry federal securities, etc. In large part, the difficulties now
facing the law of securities transfer seem to be associated with the
transition from paper to electronic representations of investments. It
would be easy to conclude that these problems are unprecedented.
We seem to face the unnerving prospect that possession of paper em-
bodiments of rights will no longer furnish the fundamental bench-
mark for adjudication of conflicting claims.
The assumption that securities transfer law has a/ways been
based on negotiable certificates is, however, quite inaccurate. In fact,
the reign of negotiability is a relatively recent, and brief, phase in the
long history of investment securities trading. In this paper, I shall
attempt to place current problems in perspective, by briefly surveying
the history of securities trading and then by examining the theoretical
underpinnings of the law of securities transfers.
Investment securities have been traded in impersonal markets for
over five hundred years. Shares in the public debt of Italian city-
states were traded as early as the fourteenth century. 1 By the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century, a stock market-in very much the
modem sense of the term-had developed in Amsterdam. Govern-
ment debts and shares in the Dutch East India Company were ac-
tively traded, and various forms of speculative futures trading were
common. Indeed, the seventeenth century Dutch have probably
never been surpassed in the madness of their financial speculation, as
in the "tulip mania" of the 16308, or the colorfulness of their terms of
derision for such speculation, as in "windhandel," or trading in fu-
tures in securities not owned.2 By 1688, the crowning evidence of a
mature stock market appeared in Amsterdam: a book on how to beat
• Copyright 1990 James Steven Rogers. All rights reserved. For comments on a draft of
this paper, I wish to thank Egan Guttman, Lance Liebman, and Paul Shupack, none of whom,
of course, bear any responsibility for its errors or oddities.
•• Professor, Boston College Law School.
I See F. Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce 1QO.01 (S. Reynolds trans. 1982).
2 See generally S. Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches 347-71 (1987).
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the stock market was published, complete with a catchy title, Confu-
sion de Confusiones. 3
As in other aspects of commerce and finance, the English soon
emulated Dutch practice. A leading historian of British joint-stock
companies has remarked that "early in the reign of William III, put
and call options, bear sales, and bull accounts were perfectly well
known; so tha~, before the end of the seventeenth century, there was
an open and highly organized market at London in stocks and shares
of companies."4 By 1698, stock price quotes were regularly published
in London.' By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the class of
stock brokers, or "stock jobbers" as they were commonly termed in
London, was sufficiently well-established, but mistrusted, to be the
object of public obloquy6 and statutory regulation.7 So too in
America, within a few decades after the Revolution, trading in state
and federal government securities was widespread.8
Although securities markets are very old, negotiable investment
certificates seem to be a rather recent development. From my rela-
tively brief historical research, I have not been able to determine when
the practice of issuing paper certificates representing investments in
public debts and joint-stock companies developed.9 Shares in the pub-
3 J. de la Vega, Confusion de Confusiones (1688).
4 I W. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock
Companies to 1720, at 443 (1912).
, E. Morgan &; W. Thomas, The Stock Exchange, Its History and Functions 76 (1962).
6 See, e.g., D. Defoe, The Anatomy of Exchange Alley; or, A System of Stock-Jobbing:
Proving that scandalous trade, as it is now carried on, to be knavish in its private practice, and
treason in its public (1719).
7 An Act to restrain the Number and ill Practice of Brokers and Stock Jobbers, 8 &; 9
Will. 3, ch. 32 (1697); An Act to prevent the infamous Practice of Stock-jobbing, 7 Goo. 2, ch.
8 (1734), made perpetual by 10 Goo. 2, ch. 8 (1737).
8 J. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations 174-212 (1917).
9 My best guess is that this was a gradual process, occurring at different times for different
forms of investment. In England, for example, some government securities were represented
by certificates very early. Exchequer bills, for example, were bearer securities from the time of
their first issuance in 1696, see J. Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English
Law 94-98 (1955), although they were not held to be fully negotiable-in the sense that a bona
fide holder took free of claims-until the decision of the King's Bench in Wookey v. Pole, 4
Bam &; Ald. I, 106 Eng. Rep. 839 (K.B. 1820). to which Judge Bayley, one of the leading
authorities on the law of bills and notes added a vigorous dissent. By contrast, paper cerifi-
cates for shares in the permanent English public debt are described as a recent innovation,
optional to the holder, as late as the nineteenth century. See W. Royle, The Laws Relating to
English and Foreign Funds, Shares, and Securities 5, 66 (1875). Practice evidently varied
considerably with respect to foreign securities traded in London in the mid-nineteenth century..
See H. Keyser, The Law Relating to Transactions on the Stock Exchange 214 (1850):
Foreign stocks vary in their character according to the mode of transferring the
property they represent, and the forms requisite to confer a good title to such
property on those who become possessed of them. Some, such as French stock and
some of the American stocks, can only be transferred in their respective countries:
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lic debt of the city-states of Renaissance Italy were not represented by
any paper certificates, but by notation on the books of the state.
Transfers were implemented by registration of the transfer on the is-
suer's books. 10 The Belgian historian, Fernand Braudel, states that
trading in shares in the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth
century could be implemented only by notation on the company's
books, not by delivery of certificates. 11 Yet it is clear that paper repre-
sentations of some form were involved in seventeenth and eighteenth
century securities trading. Contemporary sources commonly classify
shares of stock as a form of paper currency,12 and numerous satirical
engravings .of the period show some personification of folly scattering
paper shares of stock to the eager crowd. 13
others pass like Bank notes by mere delivery, and thus assume the incidents at-
tached to negotiable instruments in the hands of a bona fide holder.
10 In some respects, the fourteenth century Florentines had a more sophisticated system of
book entry securities than that adopted in the 1977 amendments to U.C.C. Article 8-multiple
"pledges" could be recorded on the public debt registration books. I am indebted to Professor
Julius Kirschner of the University of Chicago for this bit of investment securities trivia. The
results of Professor Kirschner's research on the use of security transfers of interests in the
Florentine public debt in the fourteenth century in connection with dower settlements will
appear as part of the forthcoming volume of the working group on Courts and the Develop-
ment of Commercial Law, edited by Prof. Piergiovanni of the University of Genoa, in the
Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History series.
11 F. Braudel, supra note I, at 101-02:
All shares were however nominal, and the Dutch East India Company held the
certificates; a buyer could only acquire a share by having his name entered in a
special register kept for the purpose. The company had initially thought in this
way to prevent speculation (bearer-bonds came later) but speculation could oper-
ate without ownership. The speculator was in fact selling something he did not
possess and buying something he never would; it was what was known as 'blank'
buying. The operation would be settled by a payment one way or the other and the
game would go on.
12 See, e.g., D. Hume, Of Public Credit (1752), reprinted in A Select Collection of Scarce
and Valuable Tracts and other Publications on the National Debt and the Sinking Fund at
279-80 (J.R. McCulloch Ed. 1857):
Public securities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the
current price as gold or silver. . .. No merchant thinks it necessary to keep by him
any considerable cash. Bank-stock, or India-bonds, especially the latter, serve all
the same purposes; because he can dispose of them, or pledge them to a banker, in
a quarter of an hour; and at the same time they are not idle, even when in his
scritoire, but bring him in a constant revenue.
Similarly, the article on "Paper Credit" in M. Postlethwayt, Universal Dictionary of Trade
and Commerce (1751) states that:
Paper Credit signifies, in the general, whatever property is circulated in a state, or
transferred from one person to another, by means of any written paper obligations,
instead of hard money, or merchandizes, or lands, such as bills of exchange, prom-
issory notes, bonds, mortgages; and some include herein all transfers by stocks.
13 See S. Schama, supra note 2, at 366-71. The depictions could be far cruder than that, as
in an early eighteenth century Dutch portrait reproduced in Schama's book showing a broker
eating money and excreting shares of stock. Id. at 367.
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It is, however, far less clear whether paper representations of in-
vestments in the seventeenth or eighteenth century played a role
analogous to modem stock certificates. In part, the difficulty is the
ambiguity ofterms such as "stock" or "shares." In the seventeenth or
eighteenth century, as today, such words might refer either to an in-
terest in the enterprise or to the paper representation of that interest. 14
Thus, while it is easy to find references to trading in shares of stocks,
it is not clear that these interests were embodied in paper certificates,
nor that transfers were implemented by delivery of certificates. Some
references suggest that delivery of some form of paper was essential.
For example, one passage in the 1734 act regulating stockbrokers re-
fers to "person[s] who shall sell stock to be delivered and paid for on a
certain day."ls On the other hand, contemporary descriptions of
transfer practices suggest that delivery of certificates may not have
been the essential aspect of securities trading. For example, a popular
manual entitled "Every Man His Own Broker," first published in
1761, describes the mechanism of transferring shares in the English
national debt as follows:
Having agreed with the seller concerning the price, you are
then to give him your address, that is your christian and surname,
the name of the place you live in, and your title or profession. He
being the seller, it is his business to take care of the transfer, and
prepare the receipt. In the mean time it Will be necessary for you
to take care to have the money ready for payment. Those who
keep money at their bankers, and are well known on the Exchange,
generally give a draft on them for the sum agreed on.
It will be necessary for you to keep in one part of the room, till
the transfer is prepared, that you may be at hand when wanted: for
if you be not in the way when called upon, the clerk will not wait
for you, but will proceed to other business, which may occasion
you much delay.
As soon as the transfer is prepared, and your name called, you
must go to the clerk who keeps the transfer book, who will shew in
what form the seller has transferred the sum agreed for, to you,
your heirs, and assigns. It will be necessary for you, the first time
you transact business of this nature, to read this form, in order that
14 See "Actions," in M. Postlethwayt, supra note 12:
Action of a Company is an equal part, or portion of stock, of which several joined
together make the capital fund, or stock, of a trading company. . .. Action signi-
fies also the bonds, contracts, and acknowledgments, or Stock in general, which
the directors of trading companies transfer or deliver to those who have paid their
money into the company's cash, and made themselves proprietors. Thus to deliver
an action is to expedite in due form the title by which the actionary becomes a
proprietor of the action he has taken out.
ts 7 Goo. 2, ch. 8, § 6 (1734) (emphasis added).
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you may be well acquainted with the nature of the assignment. Af-
ter this you will be directed to set your name to a form of accept-
ance of the stock transferred to you, the seller having first set his
hand to the transfer. This being done, the clerks witness the
printed receipt, which the seller gives you signed by him, and
which you must keep as a voucher for the transfer, till you have
received one dividend; at least such is the custom, though it is diffi-
cult to give any solid reason why it should be so. At any rate,
however, the receipt is of no use after receiving the first dividend,
when it had better be destroyed than kept. Many people have kept
these receipts long after 'they have sold out the stock, and their
ignorant executors on finding them, have supposed they have dis-
covered a mine, which they at last find, to their sorrow, had long
before been exhausted. Having paid the sum, and taken the re-
ceipt, the whole affair is transacted, and this is the whole of the
business the buyer has to attend to. However, be sure to take care
to sign the acceptance in the transfer-book, before you pay your
money to the seller. 16 .
It is striking that Mortimer makes no mention of delivery of anything
like a certificate representing the shares being transferred. Rather, the
papers involved seem to function only as instructions to the clerks
maintaining the book.s. Postlethwayt gives a similar description of the
mechanism of trading in Dutch East India shares in Amsterdam. 17
Indeed, as late as the mid-nineteenth century, one finds descriptions
suggesting that shares of the English national debt were traded by
16 T. Mortimer, Every Man His Own Broker (1761), as quoted in T. Mortimer, A General
Dictionary of Commerce, Trade, and Manufacturers, article on "Funds" (1810).
17 "Actions," in M. Postlethwayt, supra note 12:
The method of transferring actions, or stocks, at Amsterdam. When two persons
have agreed between themselves, or by the assistance of a broker, upon the price of
one or more actions, and they are to be delivered, the seller goes to the East-India
house, to make his declaration to the book-keeper, who immediately enters it; and,
after having made the seller sign it, causes it also to be subscribed by one of the
directors, before whom the seller must likewise declare, by word of mouth, that he
has sold it. The transfer being thus registered, and the seller having informed the
buyer of it, the latter has a right to go and assure himself farther of it at the East-
India house, in case he does not think fit to trust the person with whom he has
negociated: after which he ought to cause the value of the actions transferred to be
passed over at the bank to the sellers account, who, when he is certain that the
value has been placed to his account, or credit, at the bank, returns to the East-
India house, and signs the acquittance, or receipt, at the bottom of the transfer
which he has made. As long as this acquittance is not signed, the purchaser can-
not dispose of the action transferred, though he has paid for them: but, in case of
the seller's refusal to sign such acquittance, after receiving the full value, he may be
compelled to do so, only by a petition to the echevins, or aldermen. Each transfer
costs three florins and ten stivers, both, for the seal, and to the book-keeper.
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book transfers rather than delivery of certificates. 18
Whenever the practice of representing investments by certificates
evolved, it is quite clear that the legal attribute of negotiability was a
much later development. Indeed, the law governing investment se-
curities seems to have been quite unsettled in the eighteenth and even
nineteenth century. As late as 177G-three-quarters of a century after
trading in stocks had become common in London-as knowledgeable
a judge as Lord Mansfield referred to East India Company stock as "a
new species of property, arisen within the compass of a few years."19
Legal treatises on investment securities and stock exchange transac-
tions did not appear until the late nineteenth century.20 By that time,
paper certificates representing debt and equity investments were com-
monplace and were traded in well-organized stock exchanges. Yet
whether these paper securities could be accorded all the attributes of
negotiability remained an unsettled question until well into the pre-
sent century.21 Simple corporate or government bonds could readily
be assimilated to promissory notes, and thus held negotiable under
18 I J. McCulloch, Dictionary of Commerce, article on "Funds," at 695 (philadelphia
1840) (1st Ed. London 1834):
A bargain for the sale of stock, being agreed on, is carried into execution at the
Transfer Office, at the Bank, or the South Sea House. For this purpose the seller
makes out a note in writing, which contains the name and designation of the seller
and purchaser, and the sum and description of the stock to be transferred. He
delivers this to the proper clerk; (The letters of the alphabet are placed around the
room, and the seller must apply to the clerk who has his station under the initial of
his name. In all the offices, there are supervising clerks who join in witnessing the
transfer.]; and then fills up a receipt, a printed form of which, with blanks is ob-
tained at the office. The clerk in the mean time examines the seller's accounts, and
if he finds him possessed of the stock proposed to be sold, he makes out the trans-
fer. This is signed in the books by the seller, who delivers the receipt to the clerk;
and upon the purchaser's signing his acceptance in the book, the clerk signs the
receipt as witness. It is then delivered to the purchaser upon payment of the
money, and thus the business is completed.
This is a quotation from a book identified in McCulloch only as "Dr. Hamilton's valuable
work on the National Debt" which I have been unable to trace. The bracketed passage is a
footnote in the original. Similar descriptions are given in W. Royle, supra note 9, at 65, and H.
Keyser, supra note 9, at 107-09.
19 Nightingale v. Devisme, 5 Burr. 2589, 2592, 98 Eng. Rep. 361, 363 (K.B. 1770). Evi-
dently the East India stock was at that time represented by some form of certificate, for in
argument one of the lawyers had said, "This stock must be considered as money; like bank
bills, or other things which are current as money. It is in all respects the same as money. The
mode of transferring it, is only by delivery." 5 Burr. at 2591, 98 Eng. Rep. at 362. Mansfield,
however, rejected the analogy, holding that an action for money had and received would not
lie for the stock.
20 See H. Keyser, supra note 9; W. Royle, supra note 9.
21 See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057,
1072-76 (1954); Steffan & Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 Yale L. J. 799,
803 (1932); Note, The Applicability of the N.I.L. to Bonds, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 71, 74-75
(1925) (Later citations to this unsigned note list William O. Douglas as its author.).
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ordinary principles of the law of bills and notes.22 Yet many of the
attributes essential to investment bonds, such as provisions in munici-
pal bOnds that they were to be paid only from a specified source of
revenue, or provisions in corporate bonds stating that they were sub-
ject to the terms of the trust indenture, involved limitations and con-
ditions on the issuer's obligation to pay that were fatal to negotiability
under traditional bills and notes law.23 Similarly, interim investment
certificates representing the holder's right to receive bonds from the
underwriter proved difficult to fit within negotiable instruments law.24
The problems resulting from the effort to squeeze investment bonds
into the ill-fitting clothes of the law of bills and notes were not fully
resolved until the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Stock certificates, of course, could not be treated as bills or notes,
since they did not represent promises to pay money. In a sense, this
was fortunate since the law of stock certificates could develop inde-
pendently of bills and notes law. Full-blown negotiability, however,
was long in coming. Late nineteenth century authorities routinely de-
scribe stock certificates as "quasi-negotiable," noting that unlike bills,
notes, or bonds, a stock certificate is only evidence of the underlying
right-a "muniment oftitle."25 This was no mere matter ofterminol-
ogy. In some respects, stock certificates were treated no differently
than ordinary goods, as, for example, in the rule that the owner of
property who has not entrusted possession to the wrongdoer can re-
22 In the preface to his 1876 bills and notes treatise, J.W. Daniel remarks that one of the
principal reasons that he undertook the work was the need to treat questions concerning cor-
porate bonds, which had become prominent since the publication of the preeceding generation
of bills and notes treaties. J.W. Daniel, Treatise of the Law of Negotiable Instruments at vi
(1876).
23 See Steffan & Russell, supra note 21; Note, supra note 21.
24 In England, this issue provoked one of the classic discussions of the relationship between
commercial practice and commercial law. In Goodwin v. Robarts, 10 L.R.-Ex. 337 (1875),
Chief Judge Cockburn delivered his renowned opinion tracing the history of the law merchant
and the adaptation of English law to changing commercial practice. Cockburn held that scrip
issued by the underwriters of foreign government bonds was negotiable because it was treated
as such in the securities markets. In the United States, the problem was handled less success-
fully. In 1926, the New York Court of Appeals, in a much criticized opinion by Justice Car-
dozo, held that under the Negotiable Instruments Law such certificates could not be
negotiable. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, ISO N.E. 594 (1926). The result in the
Manhattan Co. case was reversed by the enactment of the Hofstadler Act, N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law art. 8 §§ 260-262 (repealed upon enactment of U.C.C. in 1964).
25 E.g., Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. 390, 395-96,4 A. 250, 253 (1885):
These rights and duties are in fact and law quite distinguishable from the certifi-
cates and the power to transfer those rights and duties. The certificate is evidence
that the person therein named possesses those rights and is subject to those duties,
but it is not in law the equivalent of those rights and duties. They are muniments
of title, but not the title itself; much less the real property.
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cover it even from a bona fide purchaser.26 The stock certificate did
not really become a complete reification of the shareholder's rights
until the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, promulgated in 1910.27
II. NEGOTIABILITY AND THE MARKET
That investment securities were traded for centuries before in-
vestment certificates became fully negotiable-in the lawyer's sense of
the word-suggests that negotiability should be viewed as but one of
many possible regimes of transfer rules for investment securities.
Moreover, we should be wary of assuming that negotiability is the
natural evolutionary outcome of the development of property transfer
rules. That investment securities, and various other forms of prop-
erty, developed toward negotiability in the nineteenth century sug-
gests only that the negotiability system was well suited to the needs of
that era. To conclude from this history that negotiability represents
the pinnacle of legal development is to fall victim to the biological
fallacy so well described by the English economic historian, M.M.
Postan:
In the nineteenth century sociologists and economists regarded
their age as biologists regard the homo sapiens, as the culmination
of an evolutionary process. To them epochs of history were succes-
sive stages in the uninterrupted ascent of mankind from the crude
primitivity of pre-history to the complex perfection of their own
age. 28
History, however, did not stop in the late nineteenth century. Evi-
dence from various aspects of current commercial law suggests that in
the twentieth century the general trend of development is away from
negotiability.
The traditional argument for negotiability is that the market for
investment securities, money, bills and notes, and the like could not
function if bona fide purchasers were not given complete assurance
that they would take free from any possible adverse claims. Without
such protection, the argument goes, a potential purchaser would be
26 See Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1072-75.
27 The prefatory comment to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act stated that, "The effect of
the Act is to make certificates of stock to the fullest extent possible representative of the shares,
and this is in accordance with mercantile usage."
28 Postan, Credit in Medieval Trade, I Econ. Hist. Rev. 234 (1928). The fallacy is quite
common in modem legal writing on negotiability. See, e.g., Rasor, A Critical Look at Secured
Transactions Under Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 859, 867 (1987) ("History
provides yet another reason for making the new [uncertificated] shares negotiable. Most of the
negotiable intangible rights now recognized by our legal system were once nonnegotiable, the
irresistible attraction of negotiability is apparently in the nature of commercial things.") (foot-
note omitted).
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forced to undertake the difficult, expensive, and perhaps impossible
task of investigating the provenance of the item.
The perdurability of the credo that negotiability is essential to
marketability is one of the more intriguing phenomena in the sociol-
ogy of modern Anglo-American law. In reality, there is little evi-
dence to support the conventional wisdom that negotiability is
essential to marketability. The market for investment securities is
probably the setting in modern commerce and finance that ap-
proaches most closely the paradigm of negotiability theory-an im-
personal market for widely traded financial instruments. Yet as
Professor Mooney has shown,29 in the modern world where securities
are generally held in fungible bulks by financial intermediaries, securi-
ties purchasers rarely attain bona fide purchaser status within the
meaning of the relevant article 8 provisions. Security of title is pro-
vided not by the legal doctrine of negotiability, but by reliance on the
trust- and credit-worthiness of fina~cial intermediaries, backed up by
governmental regulatory and insurance systems. Yet even in the sim-
ple world where investors keep their elaborately engraved stock certif-
icates in their safe-deposit boxes or under their mattresses, the
conventional wisdom about the importance of negotiability is belied
by reality. As I have argued elsewhere,30 negotiability is not the
mechanism for providing security of title to purchasers of investment
securities who obtain possession of certificates. For securities in regis-
tered form, a purchaser can qualify as a bona fide purchaser who
takes free from adverse claims only if she takes through an authorized
indorsement.31 If the indorsement is forged or otherwise ineffective,
the purchaser of investment securities is in the same position as the
purchaser of any form of nonnegotiable property: she takes only such
title as her transferor had. The legal doctrine that protects purchasers
of investment securities is not negotiability, but the rule that once the
old certificate has been surrendered and a new certificate has been
issued in the name of the purchaser, the owner's claim against the
purchaser is cut off and transformed into a claim against the issuer for
wrongful transfer.32 Negotiability operates as advertised only in con-
nection with investment securities in bearer form; yet these are an
endangered species on the sure route to extinction. Treasury securi-
ties have not been issued in bearer form, or indeed in any certificated
form, since the 19708. The death sentence for corporate bearer securi-
29 Mooney, Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in
Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 305 (1990).
30 Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 197 (1987).
31 U.C.C. §§ 8-302(1Xa), 8-308, 8-311(a) (1977).
32 Id. §§ 8-311(b), 8-404.
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ties was pronounced, in the roundabout fashion typical of the influ-
ence of sovereign authority on modem life, when the Internal
Revenue Code was amended to deny the deduction for interest paid
on long-term debt security issued in bearer rather than registered
form. 33
The demise of negotiability in the world of investment securities
nicely illustrates the various causes that are gradually but surely lead-
ing to the extinction of the doctrine in all of its applications. First,
negotiability doctrine rests on the assumption that the best way to
transfer abstract rights is to embody them in pieces of paper and then
physically deliver the papers from person to person. As the volume
and velocity of trading increases, the requirement of physical delivery
becomes an intolerable burden; once we pass from paper to electronic
recording of financial relationships, delivery becomes a metaphysical
absurdity.
Second, it is by no means obvious that protecting purchasers fa-
cilitates the operation of the market. For every purchaser who is pro-
tected by negotiability doctrine there is an owner who is harmed.
While I have neither the training nor inclination to endeavor a quasi-
mathematical demonstration, a simple seat-of-the-pants observation
will suffice. I never carry very much cash in the seat of my pants
precisely because I know that if I lose it, it's gone. Indeed, one of the
reasons that the Treasury ceased issuing securities in certificated
bearer form seems to have been a concern that their negotiability-
which necessarily means vulnerability to theft-diminished rather
than enhanced their attractiveness as investment vehicles. 34
Third, there is the phenomenon that may, in the end, finally seal
the fate of negotiability for any form of investment or financial instru-
ment. Any instrument that can be transferred by mere delivery is an
instrument that can be transferred without any paper trail. The
taxman and the policeman do not like that, and eventually they will
prevail. It is no accident that cocaine deals are the only large dollar
transactions in commerce that are settled in cash, nor that U.S. cur-
rency is no longer printed in large denominations.
Reality proves equally oblivious to theory if we tum to other
forms of property, starting with simple chattels. To continue with
amateur sociology of law, I am always intrigued, though no longer
surprised, to find that after several years of legal education, about
two-thirds to three-quarters of my commercial law students begin the
33 26 U.S.C. § 163(f) (1988).
34 See Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 Yale L.J. 1012, 1037-38
(1978).
1990] NEGOTIABILITY, PROPERTY, AND IDENTITY 481
class convinced that a bona fide purchaser of goods, particularly one
who purchases from an ordinary dealer, takes free of any adverse
claim.3' The explanation invariably offered is that if the bona fide
purchaser were not protected, then no one would feel secure in
purchasing goods and the market could not operate.36
The phenomenon that people do buy things even though they are
not legally protected against adverse claims could well be the starting
point for volumes of theoretical writing about the relationship be-
tween law and human behavior. I will content myself with only a few
paragraphs. The explanation that is both most and least obvious is
that Murphy's Law is not really true: most of the time things don't go
wrong. Most goods sold in stores are not stolen. Even if they were,
the true owner probably could not or would not bother to track them
down to the ultimate purchaser if for no other reason than that most
goods are quickly consumed. It would be a foolish waste of time and
effort for buyers in ordinary market transactions to investigate the
provenance9 of products, and that would be true no matter what the
rules were on stolen goods. The reason this is not obvious is probably
that the lawyer's job is to worry about what might happen if things do
go wrong, and to study the outcomes of the cases where something
did go wrong and was litigated. Tunnel vision is the occupational
hazard of lawyers, for our entire universe is the fortunately miniscule
subset of transactions that have gone awry.
One might, of course, pare down the assumptions of the instru-
mentalist argument into a more modest and thus more plausible claim
that sometimes it is worthwhile to worry about the rules on ownership
rights. Yet even admitting that to be true, it is still hard to find evi-
dence for the argument that protecting bona fide purchasers is essen-
tial to the market. The rules on stolen goods vary significantly among
different legal systems. Civil law systems tend to provide greater pro-
tection to purchasers of stolen goods than do common law systems,
but it would require an impressive bit of blind faith in instrumentalist
3' I suspect that many of them leave my class with that conviction unshaken. That would
be even more powerful evidence of the allure of the myth that protection of bona fide purchas-
ers is essential to the market were it not for the availability of a simpler explanation having to
do with the effectiveness of my teaching.
36 My hunch is that the students reach this erroneous conclusion by doing exactly what
their legal education tells them to do, synthesize particulars into general rules. Having en-
countered a variety of statutory and decisional rules permitting bona fide purchasers to take
free from particular kinds of claims, e.g., unrecorded real estate interests, claims to rescind
voluntary transfers, etc., students naturally move from these instances to a general rule that a
bona fide purchaser takes free of all adverse claims. The erroneous induction is facilitated by
the heavy emphasis on instrumental justification that characterizes much modern legal
discourse.
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creed to suppose that the rules on stolen goods have caused a signifi-
cant difference in the economic development of, say, England and
France. Quirks of history are probably a far more powerful explana-
tory tool for the variation in legal rules than theories about the impact
of law on the market. Indeed, one need not engage in comparative
legal studi~ to see this. There is a vestige in English law of the an-
cient market overt exception to the rule of nemo dat quod non habet:
any sale from a shop within the City in London is treated as a sale in
the "market overt" so that a good faith purchaser takes free of ad-
verse claims.37 Yet it seems unlikely that this is known beyond com-
merciallaw trivia circles, nor that there is any significant difference in
marketing practices or pricing between the City and Westminster.
One sometimes hears London described as a den of thieves, but I
rather doubt that the market overt rules have anything to do with
that.
There is, though, at least one line of trade that exhibits all of the
characteristics that would seem to make the instrumentalist argument
for bona fide purchaser protection most plausible-art and antiques.
The items last indefinitely, have astonishingly high value per unit, are
bought and sold frequently, and are frequently stolen. Yet under An-
glo-American law, owners of stolen art objects can and regularly do
recover them from collectors and dealers who purchased them in en-
tire good faith. To be sure, participants in the art market worry about
stolen goods, and may take some measures, proportionate to the
stakes, to investigate. The operative mechanism of protection, how-
ever, is exactly the same as in the securities business. People choose
their dealers carefully so that they will be likely to have solvent de-
fendants for contractual claims when their property rights fail.
The law of documents of title provides another useful perspective
on the role of negotiability in modem commerce. The bill of lading
developed in the era when it seemed obvious that it was quicker to
send a piece of paper through banking channels than to transport bulk
cargo by ship halfway around the world. This is no longer the case
today. For example, it has become a common occurrence for an oil
tanker to arrive at its destination long before the documents. As the
speed of transportation increases, negotiable bills of lading become
both superfluous and bothersome. In many forms of transport the
solution is simply to dispense with negotiable bills of lading. Bills of
lading never became commercially significant in the air freight busi-
ness, and commentators on ocean shipping now commonly advocate
37 See P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods 288-89 (7th ed. 1985).
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use of nonnegotiable waybills.38
The expedient of jettisoning documents of title altogether in
favor of simple contracts of carriage such as the nonnegotiable waybill
is not, however, feasible for goods that may be bought and sold many
times' while still in transit or storage. One of the principal functions
historically served by warehouse receipts and bills of lading was to
provide a system for transferring interests in bulk goods where deliv-
ery of possession was not feasible. Unfortunately, the solution ofissu-
ing negotiable documents of title which serve as symbolic tokens of
the goods is becoming dysfunctional for many of the same reasons
that led to the de facto extinction of the stock certificate.
The parallels between the securities and shipping businesses are
indeed striking. In shipping, as in securities, the first level of response
has been to create contractual band-aids as short-term solutions to the
problems that arise when commercial practice runs ahead of commer-
ciallaw. The shipping business has developed a new commercial in-
strument, the "letter of indemnity," in order to get around the
problem created by the negotiability of bills of lading. In order to
obtain possession of the oil upon arrival at its destination, a buyer
who has not yet received the bill of lading gives the shipper an indem-
nity to protect the shipper against liability for misdelivery if someone
else later shows up with the original bill of lading.39 In shipping, as in
securities, it appears that the long-term solution will be a somewhat
cumbersome compromise between electronic reality and paper-based
law. In the mid-1980s, Chase Manhattan Bank proposed the develop-
ment of a system that would do to the bill of lading what the Deposi-
tory Trust Company system has done for stock certificates-
38 See generally Tetley, Waybills: The Modern Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea (pts.
1 & 2), 14 J. Mar. L. & Com. 465 (1983), 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41 (1984); Lloyd, The Bill of
Lading: Do We Really Need It?, Lloyd's Mar. & Com. L. Q. 47 (Feb. 1989). The literature on
modern shipping is very refreshing to a negotiability skeptic such as I, for negotiability is
portrayed as a problem, not an advantage:
The waybill, not being a document of title, and therefore not having to be an origi-
nal, can be reproduced and thus has the advantage of speedy electronic transmis-
sion; the waybill's lack of negotiability also makes it a safe document which can be
handled easily and without fear of theft or loss.
The most distinctive characteristic of a waybill is its nonnegotiability. This is
its strength and its raison d'etre, but it causes problems when goods are sold in
transit, especially when they are sold more than once. Since there is no document
which can be endorsed, ownership is difficult to transfer and then prove. On the
other hand, its nonnegotiability avoids a considerable amount of fraud.
Tetley, supra, 14 J. Mar. L. & Com. at 466, 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. at 60.
39 See Hawkland, Documentary Transactions: New Solutions to Old Problems, 18 U.C.C.
L.J. 291, 304-06 (1986).
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immobilize and fictionalize them. Under the Chase Manhattan
"SeaDocs" system, the carrier would issue a bill of lading which
would be sent directly to Chase Manhattan. Trading of the cargo in
transit would then be implemented electronically by entries on Chase
Manhattan's "books."4O The bill of lading would serve about the
same function as the jumbo certificates in the DTC system-virtually
none. The papers exist only to permit a system of transfers by elec-
tronic entries on the records of financial institutions to coexist with a
legal regime that insists that possession of pieces of paper is terribly
important.
III. PROPERTY AND IDENTITY
A. Commingled Fungible Goods
Rather than asking whether investment securities should be or
must be negotiable, perhaps we would do better to examine more
carefully the question to which negotiability is an answer. The princi-
ple of negotiability is an aspect of the general topic of property trans-
fer rules. The basic question is whether someone who purchases an
item of property takes it free from or subject to prior adverse claims.
Any question of that form contains an implicit, but significant as-
sumption: that there is an "it," and that this "it" now claimed by the
purchaser is the same thing that used to belong to someone else.
Thus, the negotiability principle, or indeed any rule about transfer of
property, presupposes a theory of identity of objects. We cannot talk
about "my thing" and "your thing" unless we can distinguish "same
thing" from "different thing." In the setting of modem securities
practices, this is not idle metaphysical speculation. Rather, as
Mooney has pointed out, one of the most important attributes of mod-
em securities practice is that securities are typically held in fungible
bulks on the books of financial intermediaries. It is not at all clear
what it means to talk about my IBM stock versus your IBM stock, if
the only stock in question is held as part of a fungible bulk.
We can explore implications of fungibility-in isolation from
puzzlements about negotiability-by examining the rules of property
applied to fungible nonnegotiable property such as goods. The start-
ing point is a delightfully named body of law, "confusion of goods. "41
For the most commercially significant class of cases-grain or
40 See id. at 306-10; Merges & Reynolds, Toward a Computerized System for Negotiating
Ocean Bills of Lading, 6 J. Law & Comm. 23 (1986). I have been told that the "SeaDocs"
system has not yet caught on. No doubt something like it will eventually become operational.
41 See generally R.A. Brown, The Law of Personal Property §§ 6.8 - 6.14 (3d ed. 1975).
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other fungible commodities stored in elevators, tank farms, and the
like-the common law rules on confusion are now codified in section
7-207 of the U.C.C.:
(1) Unless the warehouse receipt otherwise provides, a ware-
houseman must keep separate the goods covered by each receipt so
as to permit at all times identification and delivery of those goods
except that different lots of fungible goods may be commingled.
(2) Fungible goods so commingled are owned in common by
the persons entitled thereto and the warehouseman is severally lia-
ble to each owner for that owner's share. Where because of overis-
sue a mass of fungible goods is insufficient to meet all the receipts
which the warehouseman has issued against it, the persons entitled
include all holders to whom overissued receipts have been duly
negotiated.
Thus, Article 7 adopts more or less the same approach as the Article
8 "proportionate ownership" rule for securities held in fungible
bulk.42
Treating all of the original owners of confused goods as tenants
in common, however, resolves only the easiest of the problems that
may arise. The harder question is what to do about disputes between
the original owners and those who claim through the bailee who holds
the commingled mass. The common law rules on confusion treat
these questions by exactly the same property rules that would apply if
there had been no confusion. Under the basic nemo dat principle, one
who derived title from the bailee who commingled the goods could
acquire no better title than the bailee had. Thus, unless the owners
authorized transfers of the property or were otherwise estopped from
asserting their claims, someone who bought all or a part of the com-
mingled mass from the bailee, or who obtained a lien or security inter-
est for a debt of the bailee, would take subject to the original owners'
claims as tenants in common.43
Article 7 does make some changes in the common law property
rules on these questions. Suppose that after the goods have been
stored and commingled, the warehouseman makes an unauthorized
sale or pledge and the transferee receives a warehouse receipt evidenc-
ing her interest. At common law, the transferee would take subject to
the ownership claims of the bailors as tenants in common. Under the
second sentence of section 7-207(2), however, the transferee would be
entitled to a proportionate share if she obtained a negotiable ware-
house receipt under circumstances that entitled her to treatment as
42 D.C.C. § 8-313(2).
43 See R.A. Brown, supra note 41, § 6.14.
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Article 7's cumbersomely named version of holder in due course, a
"holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negoti-
ated." It is, however, worth noting that this is not an instance of a
general rule that holders of negotiable documents always trump other
claimants.44 The holder of the document would not take free from
the claims of the original bailors, but would only share with them pro
rata. Moreover, the original bailors of the commingled goods would
be entitled to proportionate ownership shares regardless of whether
they obtained negotiable receipts. Section 7-207(2) speaks only of
"persons entitled" to the commingled goods, and the cases indicate
that bailors holding no special documentation would qualify.4'
The rules of section 7-207(2) are interesting as an example of the
blurring of property rules that comes with loss of discrete identity.
The first ste~that the owner-bailors of the commingled goods are
treated as owners in common-is little more than a rule of necessity:
If it is physically impossible to identify each person's property, then
there is not much else to do except divide up what is left. The next
ste~that any holder of a negotiable document covering the goods is
also entitled to a share-is somewhat more interesting. The common
law of confusion deviated from ordinary property rules only to the
extent compelled by practical necessity. All who bailed goods to the
dishonest or unfortunate bailee would be treated equally, because it
makes no sense to ask whose grain was still left in the elevator. Yet in
a dispute between the bailors and a pledgee, the common law would
say that the bailors obviously prevail because the grain in the elevator
was theirs at the time the bailee purported to pledge it. Section 7-
207(2), by contrast, shows that once we drop "mine and thine" think-
ing in one setting, it is hard to see why we should apply it in another.
If it makes no sense to resolve disputes among the bailors by asking
whose grain is whose, why should a dispute between the owners and
the pledgee be resolved by asking whether the grain was theirs or
hers? The bailors and any transferees from the bailee are all in the
same soup-or gruel. They trusted the bailee's assurance that he had
enough grain to meet all his commitments. Why, then, not treat them
all the same?46
44 The case would be treated quite differently if the goods had not been commingled fungi-
bles. If someone stored identifiable goods and the warehouseman sold or pledged them, the
transferee would get no special rights by virtue· of obtaining a negotiable document.
4S Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 37 Colo. App. 452, 552 P.2d 317 (1976); In re
Fairfield Elevators, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1973).
46 Article 7, however, does not quite go the distance of saying that all those harmed by the
shortfall should be treated equally. The cases interpreting § 7-207(2) exclude holders of non-
negotiable documents from participation in the proportionate sharing. See Midland Bean Co.
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B. Change ofSpecies
The commingling of fungible commodities is probably the most
common setting in which property transfer rules must take account of
the loss of the distinct identity of items of property. Yet in some re-
spects an even more interesting question is whether there are other
sorts of transfonnations of property which so seriously compromise
our concepts of physical identity that it becomes impossible to say
that the thing now claimed by one person was once owned by another.
Suppose that Oswald and Tom each own a 1928 Ford Model T. Tom
then steals Oswald's. Each morning, Tom flips a coin to decide which
car to drive. One day, he drives one of the flivvers off a cliff. Tom
then sells the remaining car to Barney and disappears. Can Oswald
get the remaining Model T back from Barney? The answer depends
on which car was crashed and which was sold. If Tom crashed Os-
wald's car, then Oswald is left with a worthless cause of action against
Tom, and Barney keeps his car. If Tom crashed his own car, then
Oswald gets his car back from Barney, and Barney is left with a
worthless cause of action against Tom. The really interesting ques-
tion is what would happen if before crashing one car and selling the
other, Tom had disassembled both cars, mixed all the pieces together,
and then reassembled two cars from the pile. Although the hypothet-
ical is technically a question of the law of confusion, it may be better
to begin with a related subject, sometimes referred to as the law of
accession and specification.47
Suppose that the thief, Tom, had not owned a car, but simply
stole Oswald's car and sold it to Barney. Suppose further that before
selling the car to Barney, Tom had painted it green. Clearly the re-
painting job would not alter Oswald's rights, and he could recover the
car from Barney. The change in color has not changed Oswald's
ownership of the car. It's the same car, just a different color.48 There
are, of course, scads of cases about cars that have been stolen, re-
paired, and reclaimed: Most of the disputes, however, seem to be
about whether the st:uff that has been added has become part of the
v. Farmers State Bank, 37 Colo. App. 452, 552 P.2d 317 (1976); In re Fairfield Elevators, 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1973). Moreover, at least one class of claimant fares
better. Under § 7-205 a buyer in the ordinary course from a bailee who is also in the business
of selling takes the goods free if the buyer takes delivery.
47 Confusion refers to cases where goods of one person have been mixed with those of
another. Accession refers to cases where one person's goods are added to another's such that
title passes to the owner of the whole. Specification refers to cases where goods are so signifi-
cantly changed that title is lost because the goods can no longer be regarded as the same thing.
48 By contrast, the repainting has significantly changed rights to the paint. By virtue of
being attached to the car, the paint becomes part of the car so that Oswald would acquire title
to the paint by accession.
488 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:471
car so that it goes to the owner who reclaims the car.49 The more
interesting point for purposes of this article is whether there comes a
point when the car has been so changed that it no longer can be iden-
tified as the same car, and the original owner's claim evaporates.
The starting point for considering that question is the Institutes
of Justinian:
When a man makes a new object out of materials belonging to an-
other, the question usually arises, to which of them, by natural rea-
son, does this new object belong-to the man who made it, or to
the owner of the materials? For instance, one man may make
wine, or oil, or com, out of another man's grapes, olives, or
sheaves; or a vessel out of his gold, silver, or bronze; or mead of his
wine and honey; or a plaster or eyesa1ve out of his drugs; or cloth
out of his wool; or a ship, a chest, or a chair out of his timber.
After many controversies between the Sabinians and Proculians,
the law has now been settled as follows, in accordance with the
view of those who followed a middle course between the opinions
of the two schools. If the new object can be reduced to the materi-
als of which it was made, it belongs to the owner of the materials; if
not, it belongs to the person who made it. For instance, a vessel
can be melted down, and so reduced to the rude material-bronze,
silver, or gold~fwhich it is made: but it is impossible to recon-
vert wine into grapes, oil into olives or com into sheaves, or even
mead into the wine and honey of which it was compounded.so
According to Blackstone, English law followed Roman law on this
point, permitting the owner of the goods to recover them in their al-
tered state, unless the alterations were so great that "the thing itself,
by such operation, was changed into a different species."si The tough
question, of course, is what counts as a change of species.
The above-quoted passage from the Institutes seems to treat this
as a question of reversibility: the owner of silver bullion can recover
the teapot made from it because the teapot could be melted down into
the original bullion, but the owner of the grapes cannot recover the
wine. That rule, however, would cut off the owner's claims in a very
broad range of cases, and Anglo-American law seems to have taken a
somewhat different approach. In a late fifteenth century English case,
the owner of leather was allowed to recover shoes that had been made
from the leather. The year book report suggests that the judges saw
the issue not as whether the materials could be reconstituted from the
49 See Annotation, Accession to Motor Vehicle, 43 A.L.R.2d 813 (1955).
so Inst. Just. 2.1.25 (J.B. Moyle trans. 5th ed. 1913).
SI 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 404 (1766).
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finished object, but whether the materials could clearly be traced into
the object:
And as to the case of grain taken and malt made of it, the party
cannot retake it, because the grain cannot be known. And so of
pennies or groats, when another piece is made of them, this cannot
be taken-because one penny cannot be distinguished from an-
other. So also is it if one take a piece and from it make pennies at
the mint, the party cannot take the pennies, because they cannot be
known one from the other. And so of all similar cases.52
That rule, however, would allow the owner to retake the finished
goods in virtually any case, no matter how great the transformation,
as in the hypothetical of the grapes made into wine, or in the many
nineteenth century American cases in which owners of trees prevailed
against people who had wrongfully, though often by mistake, cut the
trees and milled them into lumber products.53
Given the difficulty of deciding what counts as a change of spe-
cies as an abstract question of logic or metaphysics, it is hardly sur-
prising that courts have sought other grounds for decision.54 As in so
many other areas of the law, there is great appeal in rules that appear
to decide the cases against the wrongdoer. The leading American de-
cision taking this approach, Silsbury v. McCoon,55 came out of the
actual occurrence of the grapes into wine hypothetical, suitably
adapted to American conditions. A creditor levied on whisky dis-
tilled from grain that belonged to the debtor but had, in some fashion
not well explained in the case, come into the wrongful possession of
the distiller. The distiller argued that regardless of whether his pos-
session of the grain was wrongful, the grain was just gone. The
whisky was a new species. The creditor, however, had offered to
prove that the distiller knew perfectly well that the grain belonged to
someone else, so that in this case the conscious wrongdoer himself
was contending that his wrongful act cut off the owner's claim. This
was too much for a majority of the New York Court of Appeals, who
ruled that a conscious wrongdoer could not acquire property in the
goods by any change no matter how dramatic or extensive. The
52 Y.B., 5 Hen. 7, fo. 16, pI. 6, as quoted in Silsbury v. McCoon, 4 Denio 332, 335-36 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1847), rev'd, 3 N.Y. 379 (1850).
53 See, e.g., Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 47 S.W. 123 (1898); Isle Royale Mining Co. v.
Hertin, 37 Mich. 332 (1877).
54 Perhaps the most important factor in the modem decisions is the comparison of the
value of the goods before and after the alteration. See R.A. Brown, supra note 41, § 6.2. The
leading case on this aspect of the problem is Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (1871), holding
that the owner of standing timber worth twenty-five dollars could not replevy barrel hoops
worth nearly seven hundred dollars.
55 3 N.Y. 379 (1850).
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change of species rule would apply, so the court said, only in cases of
transformations made by persons who innocently held another's
property.
Distinguishing between the innocent and guilty, however, only
evades the issue when the dispute is between two innocents. Suppose,
for example, that the whisky in Si/sbury had been sold to a bona fide
purchaser. Under the general rule that a purchaser acquires only
such rights as his transferor had, the purchaser's title would depend
on the distiller's. Thus, under the rule applied in Si/sbury, the owner
of the grain would prevail against the purchaser if the distiller had
been a conscious wrongdoer, but would lose if the distiller had been
acting under a mistake as to ownership of the grain. A similar ap-
proach has been followed in many of the decisions on confusion of
goods. It is commonly said that if a conscious wrongdoer takes an-
other's goods and commingles them with his own, the wrongdoer for-
feits his claim to his own property, and the victimized owner can take
the entire commingled mass.56 Applied to my hypothetical of the two
cars, that would mean that if Tom disassembled the cars and then
reassembled two cars from the pile of pieces, Oswald might be able to
assert a claim to both cars. If so, the car that Tom sold to Barney
would be treated as Oswald's so that Oswald could recover it from
Barney.
The irony of this outcome becomes apparent when we compare it
to the hypothetical of the unmixed cars, one of which, chosen at ran-
dom, was destroyed. There is no question in any of these cases that
Tom is a bad fellow. He ought to have his knuckles rapped, and
either be rehabilitated or drawn and quartered depending on the mo-
res of the time. That, however, tells us nothing about whether Os-
wald or Barney should suffer the loss. There really is no terribly
compelling ethical basis, or at least none arising out of the equities of
the particular case, for choosing between Oswald and Barney. The
outcome depends solely on the coin toss that controlled which car
Tom would drive the day he crashed. That may seem arbitrary, but
nobody said life was going to be fair. It's a terrible shame that some
people's cars get destroyed and other people's cars don't, but that's
just the way it is. Or, more to the point, that's what it means to say
that this is my car and that is your car.
Therein lies the real lesson to be drawn from the hypotheticals.
If we are going to have rules of mine and thine, then we must ac-
knowledge that there will be plenty of cases where outcomes tum on
56 See R.A. Brown, supra note 41, § 6.11.
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rules or conventions of physics rather than ethics. The result in the
unmixed car hypothetical depends entirely on the physical identity of
the car that was destroyed; yet I doubt that any of us would say that
the loss should be divided equally between Oswald and Barney simply
because the choice of which car to destroy was made by flipping a
coin. The choice was arbitrary, but it was a choice about whether
Oswald's car or Tom's car would be destroyed. If we accept the im-
plications of physical identity in the unmixed car case, then we cannot
so easily evade the problem i~ the mixed car hypothetical where, by
hypothesis, we are foreclosed from the only way that we have of de-
ciding whether Oswald gets back a car or is left with a worthless cause
of action.
Returning to the simpler class of cases where goods are not com-
mingled but are significantly altered, there may be more wisdom than
is commonly thought in the seemingly crude rule that whether the
owner of the grapes, leather, or grain can recover the wine, shoes, or
whisky depends on whether "it's the same thing." The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court put the point nicely in deciding that the owner of
trees could not recover a canoe made from them:
The property is changed by a change made in its species or sub-
stantial form . . . . This doctrine is not based on the idea that a
trespasser ... can lawfully transfer the property in timber from the
owner to himself by changing it into some more valuable species;
but on the idea that the trespasser by so doing destroys the original
article, as if he had burned it, and is responsible to the owner, as if
he had burned it . . .. S7
Perhaps that should be the answer in the mixed car hypothetical as
well. By disassembling Oswald's car and mixing the pieces, Tom de-
stroyed the separate physical identity of the two cars, and thereby
eliminated the only justification for allowing Oswald a property right
to the remaining car rather than simply a right of compensation from
Tom. Deontology follows ontology.
C. Equity Tracing Rules
Another setting in which to explore the relationship between
property and identity is the law of tracing. Suppose that our malefac-
tor Tom, who owns no car of his own, steals Oswald's car. Obviously
Oswald can recover the car from Tom. Suppose that Tom becomes
insolvent. Can Oswald recover the car from the estate, or is Oswald
left only with a claim for compensation to be paid pro rata from the
assets of the estate, including the car? The other creditors would, of
S7 Potter v. Mardre, 74 N.C. 36, 40 (1876).
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course, prefer to have the car treated as an asset of the estate, but it
seems obvious that this would be unfair. Tom's creditors have no
right to have their debts paid from somebody else's property. It's still
Tom's car and he can get it back by replevin.
Suppose, though, that before disappearing from the scene, Tom
had swapped the stolen car for a boat. Oswald can, of course, recover
his car from the person who swapped the boat, or anyone else into
whose hands the car comes. That, however is not the topic of present
concern. Let us simply suppose that both the car and the person who
swapped the boat for the car have vanished without a trace. The
question is whether Oswald can assert a claim to the boat, or the boat
becomes an asset of the estate and Oswald is just another creditor.
By a curious mixture of remedial law and trust doctrine, it has
become well-settled that Oswald can assert an equitable claim to the
boat, or indeed to any property that he can identify as the traceable
product of his original car, no matter how many swaps or other
changes there may have been. In the setting of express trusts, the
courts of equity developed fairly complex rules that permit trust bene-
ficiaries to assert their beneficial interest against property that the
trustee had improperly acquired with trust funds. All that was
needed to tum these trust rules into a generally applicable remedial
device against thieves or others who wrongfully acquired property
was to treat the converter as a constructive trustee of the stolen prop-
erty and then apply the tracing rules as if the thief had held the prop-
erty under an express truSt.'8
The key to Oswald's success is whether he can "trace" the prop-
erty, that is, he must make a specific factual showing that Tom
swapped Oswald's car for the boat, that boat for the painting, and so
forth. Oswald's claim to preferred treatment over Tom's other credi-
tors is not based on any general principle that victims of theft have a
higher claim than other creditors. IfTom had destroyed Oswald's car
rather than swapping it for a boat, Oswald's claim against Tom's es-
tate would be no different from that of a voluntary unsecured credi-
tor. Rather, Oswald's claim to the boat seems to be based on the same
'8 The leading American case allowing constructive trust relief against a converter is
Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1877). General authorities state categorically that the con-
structive trust remedy is available "whether or not there is a fiduciary relationship between the
claimant and the wrongdoer." Restatement of Restitution § 202 comment b (1937). Pleaders,
however, apparently do not always feel confident about that point, leading to such odd allega-
tions as that the responsibilities of a janitor who stole money from a bank were "to sweep the
bank's offices, to arrange and care for the furniture therein, and, while in the discharge of his
said duties, to watch over, guard, and preserve, to the extent of his ability, all property of the
bank, including moneys, notes, and papers." Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 546,
548, 71 N.W. 294, 295 (1897).
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principle that pennits Oswald to reclaim his own car from the thief's
estate rather than having only a claim for its value. Just as Tom's
other creditors have no legitimate claim to have their debts satisfied
from Oswald's car, so they have no legitimate claim to have their
debts satisfied from the boat that Tom obtained by swapping the car.59
Professor Oesterle bas suggested that the tracing rules rest on a
crude concept of causation. The reason that Oswald can recover the
boat, and that Tom's other creditors have no just claim to the boat, is
that the boat would not have been there but for Tom's theft of Os-
wald's car.60 Oesterle argues quite persuasively that the causal argu-
ment is untenable. Oesterle makes the point by a series of
hypotheticals much like the stolen car cases considered herein.61 Sup-
pose, for example, that Tom stole two cars, one from Oswald and one
from Mary. Tom sold Mary's car, using the proceeds to pay his living
expenses, and he swapped Oswald's car for the boat. Standard tracing
rules would give the boat to Oswald and leave Mary with a mere un-
secured claim for the value of her car. Yet, argues Oesterle, how can
one say that the theft of Oswald's car, rather than Mary's, caused the
boat to be there when the curtain fell. One could just as easily say
that the theft of Mary's car was the causal key, for if Tom had not
stolen Mary's car, he would have been forced to sell Oswald's car to
pay his living expenses. Accordingly, Oesterle argues that preferring
Oswald over Mary is unjustifiable.
The fascinating thing about Oesterle's argument is that it works
just as well against allowing someone to recover his own property.
Suppose that Tom simply stole the two cars, sold Mary's for living
expenses, and kept Oswald's. Why should Oswald be able to recover
the car and Mary be left with a worthless cause of action? Can't
Mary contend that the only reason that Oswald's car is still there is
that Tom stole Mary's car, and so did not have to sell Oswald's? The
answer must be that although Mary's causal argument is perfectly
plausible, it has nothing to do with why Oswald gets his car back.
The reason Oswald gets his car back is that it's his car. The reason
59 This is presumably the thought captured in Judge Swan's well-known Quip that the basis
for the tracing remedy in express trust cases is that "the fiduciary's creditors have accepted the
risk of his solvency, while his cestuis have accepted only the risk of his honesty." In re
Kountze Bros., 79 F.2d 98,102 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 640 (1935). The oddity is
that the only occasion for application of tracing rules is to save the cestuis from consequences
of the fiduciary's dishonesty-the risk they are said to have assumed.
60 Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in
Equity and in U.C.C. § 9-306,68 Cornell L. Rev. 172 (1983).
61 To give credit where due, I should tum that sentence around and acknowledge that
Oesterle's article first put me in mind of the hypotheticals discussed herein and some of their
implications.
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that his car is still there and her car is gone is that life is not fair, but
it's still his car.62 These thoughts suggest that if there is to be any
sound basis for the tracing rules, we must look not to causal chains
between the original property and the traceable product, but to some
argument closer to an assertion that the traceable product should be
treated as the same thing as the original property. Thus, the equity
tracing rules might be seen as analogous to the rules on accession,
specification, and confusion. .That perspective has particularly inter-
esting implications for the most important application of the tracing
rules, the commingled account situation.
Suppose that Tom steals $100 in cash from Oswald and deposits
it in a bank account containing $500 of Tom's own money. Thereaf-
ter, Tom makes various withdrawals and deposits of his own funds.
By the time Oswald discovers the theft, Tom has become insolvent
leaving $300 in the bank account and thousands of dollars of other
unpaid debts. Can Oswald recover $100 from the account, or is he
treated only as a creditor with a $100 claim to share in the pro rata
distribution of Tom's assets? Under the standard "lowest intermedi-
ary balance" tracing rules, Oswald will be able to claim $100 of the
money in the account, provided that the account balance never
dropped below $100.
In crude form, the commingled account tracing rules are based
on presumptions about the intent of the wrongdoer. In the leading
case, In re Hallett's Estate,63 a fiduciary had deposited trust funds in
his personal account and then made withdrawals, leaving an account
balance in excess of the amount of trust funds deposited in the ac-
count. Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, ruled that the benefici-
ary could assert a claim to the remaining funds on the grounds that
the fiduciary must be presumed to have intended to withdraw his own
funds, as he had a right to do, rather than wrongfully withdrawing
the beneficiary's funds. 64 Of course, if the withdrawals continue to
62 I posed this question to Professor Oesterle in a letter shortly after publication of his
article. His answer was about the same as mine:
If tracing the right to possession (or title) is artificially created, the plaintiff never
had the item requested in specie; in your case the right of replevin is based on the
plaintiff's one-time, rightful possession of the item. Rightly or wrongly, we distin-
guish between the two cases, just ask a poor bloke who has paid fair value for
stolen property.
Letter from Dale Oesterle to author (Oct. 3, 1983).
63 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879).
64 Jessel expressed the point as follows:
Now, first upon principle, nothing can be better settled, either in our own law, or, I
suppose, the law of all civilised countries, than this, that where a man does an act
which may be rightfully performed, he cannot say that that act was intentionally
and in fact done wrongly.... Wherever it can be done rightfully, he is not allowed
1990] NEGOTIABILITY, PROPER TY, AND IDENTITY 495
the point that the account balance drops below the amount of trust
assets deposited in it, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the fiduci-
ary has withdrawn and dissipated trust funds. At that point the issue
is whether subsequent deposits of the fiduciary's own funds are
treated as restoring the amount of the trust funds or whether the ben-
eficiary's claim is limited to the lowest balance. The general rule is
that deposits of the fiduciary's own funds are not treated as restoring
the beneficiary's claim, at least in the absence of specific evidence that
the fiduciary so intended.65
As the commingled fund tracing rules developed, they became
increasingly difficult to explain on any coherent theory of presumed
intent. Suppose that Tom stole $100 from Oswald and deposited it in
an account containing $100 of Tom's own money. Thereafter, Tom
withdrew $100 and bought stock, leaving $100 in the account. The
issue, as posed by the standard tracing rules, is whether Tom's money
went to the stock, or was left in the account. The presumption of
rightful withdrawal, applied literally, could produce a rather odd re-
sult in this situation. Ifwe say that Tom tried'to act as honestly as his
means permitted, then we assume that he first withdrew his own
funds, leaving Oswald's $100 in the account. Thus, Oswald would
have no claim to the stock, and, if the remaining $100 in the account
is later withdrawn and dissipated, Oswald is left with no traceable
claim. Most of the cases, however, follow the English decision in In
re Oatway,66 holding that Oswald has a claim to any valuable assets
to say, against the penon entitled to the property or the right, that he has done it
wrongfully. That is the universal law.
When we come to apply that principle to the case of a trustee who has
blended trust moneys with his own, it seems to me perfectly plain that he cannot
be heard to say that he took away the trust money when he had a right to take
away his own money. The simplest case put is the mingling of trust moneys in a
bag with money of the trustee's own. Suppose he has a hundred sovereigns in a
bag, and he adds to them another hundred sovereigns of his own, so that they are
commingled in such a way that they cannot be distinguished, and the next day he
draws out for his own purposes (£)100, is it tolerable for anybody to allege that
what he drew out was the first (£)100, the trust money, and that he misappropri-
ated it, and left his own (£)100 in the bag? It is obvious he must have taken away
that which he had a right to take away, his own (£)100. What difference does it
make if, instead of being in a bag, he deposits it with his banker, and then pays in
other money of his own, and draws out some money for his own purposes? Could
he say that he had actually drawn out anything but his own money? His money
was there, and he had a right to draw it out, and why should the natural act of
simply drawing out the money be attributed to anything except to his ownership of
money which was at his bankers?
Id. at 727-28.
65 Restatement of Restitution § 212 (1937). Perhaps the thought is that once the line of
clear dishonesty has been crossed, the fiduciary's honor is irredeemably spoiled.
66 2 Ch. 356 (1903).
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purchased from the commingled fund, even if they were acquired at a
time when sufficient funds remained in the account to satisfy the
owner's claim. That, however, means that we really cannot answer
the question of whose money went where until we learn what hap-
pened to the stock and the remaining funds in the account. If the
account balance was dissipated and the stock remains valuable, the
tracing rules say that Tom's money went to the stock. On the other
hand, if the stock became valueless and the other $100 remained in
the account, the standard rules say that Tom's money stayed in the
account. In other words, we'll decide whose money went where only
after we find out what happened to the stock and the account.
In reaction against the peculiarities of the standard explanations,
an alternative theory is set out in the Restatement of Restitution, at-
tempting to explain the commingled fund tracing rules without any
artificial presumptions about intent. Indeed, the Restatement theory
seeks to avoid entirely any talk about whose money is whose. The
Restatement approach has two components. The first part, which has
substantial support in the cases, avoids the peculiarities of presumed
intent by regarding Oswald's claim not as an assertion of equitable
ownership of some component of the commingled fund and its prod-
ucts, but as an equitable lien securing Oswald's right to reimburse-
ment.67 When Oswald's $100 was commingled in the account with
Tom's own $100, what really happened is that Oswald's funds and
Tom's funds combined to produce a new asset, the $200 claim against
the bank. Tom has a right to repayment of his $100 that contributed
to the creation of that asset, and it makes perfect sense to say that he
is entitled to a lien on the asset as security for reimbursement. If the
asset is later divided or transformed, all of the component parts re-
main subject to the lien. Thus, without any talk about presumed in-
tent or whose money went where, we can reach a result consistent
with the cases: Oswald has a right to recover his $100 from the com-
mingled fund, or from any assets purchased from it.
The more difficult question arises if it turns out that some asset
purchased from the commingled fund has significantly appreciated in
value. There is some dispute in the tracing literature about whether
someone who can trace into an appreciated asset should be entitled to
take the entire asset, even if its value exceeds the amount of the origi-
nalloss.68 That, however, is rarely the issue. Rather, the real cases
are ones in which most of the stolen funds have been dissipated but
some part can be traced into an asset which has appreciated to some
67 Restatement of Restitution §§ 209, 210(1), 211 (1937).
68 See 1 G.E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution §§ 2.14-.15 (1978).
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extent, though not to the extent of the owner's loss. Suppose for ex-
ample that Tom had stolen $1000 from Oswald, lost $900 at the race
track, and then deposited the remaining $100 in the account along
with Tom's own $100. Tom then withdraws $100, buys stock, and
dissipates the rest of the funds in the account. If the stock is now
worth $500, can Oswald claim it, or is he left with at most an equita-
ble lien securing his claim for reimbursement of the $100 of his money
that went into the account from which the stock was purchased?
Professor Palmer has pointed out that the cases frequently give
Oswald a claim to the entire amount of the stock in such situations.
One would apply the "whose money went where" rules to determine
whether Oswald can trace into the stock; and, if he can, the stock will
be held in constructive trust for Oswald.69 The Restatement takes a
different approach, summarized epigrammically by Austin Wakeman
Scott, the Reporter for this section of the Restatement: "[the owner]
should be entitled to a part of the whole but should not be allowed to
take the whole of a part."70 Expressed less cleverly-but more under-
standably-the thought is that if Oswald wants to assert a claim of
equitable ownership, rather than simply an equitable lien, he has to
acknowledge that the account was originally composed partly of his
money and partly of money to which he had no claim. Thus, when
Oswald's $100 was commingled in the account with Tom's $100, each
owned a fifty percent share of the combined asset. Accordingly, if
funds are withdrawn for the purchase of stock or other assets, those
assets would also be owned by Oswald and Tom in equal shares.
Thus, the Restatement expresses the commingled fund rules as
follows:
(1) Where a person wrongfully mingles money of another with
money of his own and with the mingled fund acquires property, the
other is entitled to an equitable lien upon the property to secure his
claim for reimbursement. (2) If the wrongdoer knew that he was
acting wrongfully, the other is entitled at his option to a share of
the property in such proportion as his money bore to the whole
amount of the fund. 71
Palmer has pointed out that although this formulation works fine
in simple cases of the sort given as illustrations in the comments to
section 210, it is extremely difficult to determine how the "in such
proportion as his money bore to the whole amount of the fund"
69 Id. §§ 2.16-.17.
70 A. Scott and W. Fletcher, The Law of Trusts, § 517.2, at 631 (4th ed. 1989).
71 Restatement of Restitution § 210(1)-(2) (1937).
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formula is supposed to apply in more complex cases.72 Suppose that
Tom originally stole $10,000 from Oswald, but lost $9,000 of it at the
race track. Tom then opened a bank account and deposited the re-
maining $1000. Each week thereafter, Tom deposited $100 of his own
wages in the account, and withdrew $100 from the account for living
expenses. Thus, the account balance fluctuated from $1000 to $1100,
but never dropped below $1000. After some weeks, months, or years,
Tom withdrew $1000 from the account and bought stock. The stock
has now appreciated in value to $5000. If Oswald wants to assert a
claim under Restatement section 21O(b) to take a proportionate share
of the stock, what is the proportion? One possibility is that all of the
amounts of Tom's own money that went into the account are added
up and compared to the amount of Oswald's money that went into the
account. That calculation, however, is not really accurate, for it ig-
nores the withdrawals. After Tom made his first $100 deposit, the
proportionate share of the $1100 account under Restatement section
21O(b) would be lO/llths. But at that point, Tom withdrew $100 and
dissipated it. Thus, the amount of the remaining $1000 account bal-
ance equitably owned by Oswald would be lO/llths of $1000, or
$909. Then, Tom added $100 of his own money bringing the account
balance back up to $1100. The amount of Oswald's money that went
into that $1100 account was $909, so that Oswald's proportionate
share at that point dropped to 909/1100, or about 83 percent. With
each withdrawal and deposit, Oswald's proportionate share would
change. Assuming the amount of each week's withdrawal and deposit













Of course, in any real case, the calculation would be much more com-
plicated, since the amount of the withdrawals and deposits would
vary, and would be unlikely to occur at regular weekly intervals.
72 G.E. Palmer. supra note 68. § 2.17.
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Palmer, who posed an example even less complex than this, threw up
his hands at the Restatement's formulation, remarking that "No court
has engaged in such computations, or is likely to do SO."73 Rather,
the courts would probably follow the lowest intermediate balance
rule, regarding the deposits and withdrawals as nothing more than
addition and subtraction of Tom's own money, leaving the $1000 of
Oswald's money in the account throughout the period. Thus, the
$1000 used to buy the stock was Oswald's money, and Oswald can
assert a constructive trust on the entirety of the stock, taking it at its
$5000 appreciated value.
One way of describing the commingled account tracing rules is to
regard them as mathematical algorithms corresponding to differing
physical descriptions of what happens when money is combined with
other money in an account. As applied to relatively simple cases, the
standard rules treat the situation as if oil and water had been com-
bined in a container. The owner's stolen money sinks to the bottom
like water, and the thief's own money floats atop like oil. Withdraw-
als are siphoned from the top, so that the thief's own oil must be
exhausted before any of the owner's water is drawn off. Yet, once
some of the owner's water has been drawn off, no later deposit of the
thief's oil can replenish the missing water. The new oil will simply
float on top of the diminished quantity of water.
The aptness of the oil and water metaphor shows how absurd the
standard tracing rules are. The rules assume away the very problem
they are supposed to solve. The problem is how to treat cases where
various sources of funds have been commingled and cannot be sepa-
rated. The tracing rules simply pretend that the commingling did not
occur and treat the cases as if the stolen money retained its separate
existence. The appropriate physical analog is not water and oil, but
completely soluble liquids. Suppose, for example, that Tom steals a
bottle of gin and then periodically pours an ounce out of the bottle,
replacing it with an ounce of pure water.74 No amount of pretending
is going to keep the gin and water separate. The amount of gin in the
solution will diminish with each withdrawal and dilution. Indeed, the
percentage of gin in the mixture will diminish according to exactly the
same formula suggested by the Restatement's "proportionate part"
tracing formula. Thus, the Restatement rule, which seems so odd at
first blush, turns out to be a perfectly accurate algorithm for the ac-
73 Id.
74 cr. Richardson v. Atkinson, 1 Strange 576, 93 Eng. Rep. 710 (nisi prius 1723) ("The
drawing out part of the vessel, and filling it up with water, was a conversion of all the liquor
....").
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tual problem of deciding how much of the owner's stolen money is
"still in" the account.75
Perhaps an even more interesting way of looking at the water and
gin metaphor is to ask whether the liquid in the bottle is still gin after
a few rounds have been poured out and replaced with water. The
answer, of course, depends on our definition of "gin." We might re-
gard that as a very profound metaphysical question, but for present
purposes the best approach is a simple, practical one. Could you,
without embarrassment, serve a guest a gimlet made with the contents
of the bottle? Or, if you prefer a somewhat less rigorous test, would
you bother drinking it yourself after a hard day? The most important
point of the metaphor is that there is no hard-and-fast line. After a
few dilutions, it may still make sense to regard the liquid as gin, but
before very long one has no choice but to acknowledge that it's just
not gin any more.76 It might still be good for something else, but you
can't make a decent gimlet with it.
Before discussing the commingled account rules, I suggested that
the tracing rules in general cannot be based on causal notions, but
must rest on some form of assertion that the traceable product can
aptly be described as the "same thing" as the original property. As
we saw, the only good reason for saying that the owner of a stolen car
gets back his car, while the owner of a car that was stolen and crashed
gets only a worthless cause of action, is that in one case the thief still
has the same car while in the other case that car is gone. So too, the
only good reason for saying that someone whose money was stolen
and deposited in an account gets back some portion of the account
would be that it makes sense to regard the account balance, or some
part of it, as still being the "same thing" as the owner's money which
was commingled in the account. If we take that question seriously,
we end up not with the elegant precision of the lowest intermediate
balance rule, but with the complexity of the Restatement proportion-
75 The Restatement applies the proportionate part fonnula only where the owner seeks a
constructive trust rather than an equitable lien. Thus in the hypothetical where Tom deposited
$1000 of Oswald's money and then added and withdrew $100 each week, the Restatement
would allow Oswald an equitable lien on the account for $1000. Restatement of Restitution
§§ 211, 212 (1937). The proportionate part fonnula would apply only if Oswald sought to
enforce a constructive trust on the account or assets purchased from it. Id. at §§ 210(2),
211(2), 212 comment b. If, however, tracing rules can be justified only on the basis of conven-
tions about identity, then the proportionate part fonnulation should apply to the equitable lien
remedy as well.
76 But cf. State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquor, 76 Iowa 243,245,41 N.W. 6 (1888) ("[T]he
statute provides that alcohol is an intoxicant whenever and however used as a beverage; and no
matter how it may be diluted or disguised, it so remains, simply because the statute so declares.
The liquor in question contained alcohol, and therefore it, as a matter of law, was
intoxicating.").
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ate part rule or a very imprecise sense that one can trace into a com-
mingled account only if there haven't been "too many" subsequent
transactions.
For purposes of this paper, it is not particularly important how
one would set up the equity tracing rules were one to start from
scratch. Rather, the important thing about the tracing rules is what
they reveal about the relationship between legal concepts of property
and nonlegal intuitions about physical identity. The commingled
fund tracing rules are perhaps the most elaborate and detailed attempt
anywhere in our legal system to retain the normative consequences of
mine versus thine even though the objects of these property concepts
have irretrievably lost their identifiable thingness. As we have seen,
the results are not impressive.
IV. WHY Is MONEY NEGOTIABLE?
In the preceding section, we have been looking at the least "nego-
tiable" form of property, ordinary goods, and asking whether prop-
erty talk must yield with loss of discrete identity. Now, let us tum to
the most "negotiable" form of property, money, and ask whether the
rules governing competing claims are related to questions of identity.
Aside from complexities such as the commingled fund problems,
the rules governing competing claims to money are about as simple as
can be. Anyone who takes money in good faith and for value takes it
free of all adverse claims. The usual explanation for the rule is that it
would impede the utility of money if a good faith taker were subject to
remote claims, for then people would be less willing to accept money
as payment without making inquiries about its provenance. Stated in
such starkly instrumentalist terms, the argument seems rather im-
plausible. One suspects that people's inclination to accept money has
a great deal more to do with the upside potential than the downside
risks. People do, in fact, routinely accept paper money without any
investigation even though receipt of the paper might tum out not to
give one entitlement to that many dollars. I never examine the bills
offered to me in change to·see whether they might be counterfeit, and
I doubt that I am atypical in this respect. Yet I suspect that the odds
are at least as great that I might get stuck with a counterfeit bill as
that I might get stuck with stolen money if the legal rule were that the
true owner of money could recover it from a bona fide purchaser. I
suspect that the explanation for the negotiability of money lies not in
whether a different rule would really affect behavior, but in the fact
that there is something inappropriate about the whole concept of
ownership of specific items of money.
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In teaching commercial law, I have often begun the discussion of
the concepts of negotiability and holder in due course by asking a
student to produce a coin from her wallet. I then ask to see the coin,
examine it carefully and announce that I have discovered on the basis
of careful examination of minute scratch marks that this is the very
same coin that I lost several days before and accordingly it is mine.
The response, tellingly, is always laughter. Someone, and I cannot
now recall who, once said that the core of all humor is the dislocation
of concepts. I suspect that the students' laughter at my claim of "true
ownership" of the coin reflects an intuitive realization that the con-
cept of true owner is simply inapt in the case of money."
In the famous case of Miller v. Race,78 Lord Mansfield based the
holding that one can acquire good title to a stolen negotiable instru-
ment on the fact that the instrument in question, a Bank of England
note, functioned as money. In the critical passage of the opinion,
Mansfield offered the following explanation of the principle that one
who loses money to a thief cannot recover it from one into whose
hands it falls:
It is a pity that reporters sometimes catch at quaint expressions
that may happen to be dropped at the bar or bench; and mistake
their meaning. It has been quaintly said, "that the reason why
money cannot be followed is, because it has no ear-mark:" but this
is not true. The true reason is, upon account of the currency of it:
it can not be recovered after it has passed in currency. So, in the
case of money stolen, the true owner can not recover it, after it has
been paid away fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona fide
consideration; but before money has passed in currency, an action
may be brought for the money itself.79
It is not entirely clear what Mansfield meant by his dismissal of the
"money has no ear-mark" notion. Perhaps he was taking the sugges-
tion as an assertion of empirical fact, and hence thought of the sug-
gested basis of the rule as a direct application of the law of confusion
of goods. If so, he was entirely correct, for the principle of the "nego-
tiability" of money is in some respects a distinct step beyond the law
of confusion of goods. Title to goods is lost by confusion only if it is
physically impossible to identify one's own property and distinguish it
77 To be precise, I should qualify my thesis that ownership concepts are inapplicable to
money, insofar as the owner of money can recover it from the thief or from someone who did
not take it in good faith and for value. See Shupack, Cashier's Checks, Certified Checks, and
True Cash Equivalence, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 467, 476-78 (1985). The essential point remains
despite qualifications, for a notion of identity which evaporates as soon as the thing passes
from the original wrongdoer is but a vestige of our basic concepts of property.
78 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
79 Id. at 457, 97 Eng. Rep. at 401.
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from the commingled mass. By contrast, a claim to stolen money is
cut off even though it is possible to identify a specific coin or bill.
On the other hand, it is far from clear what Mansfield had in
mind by his suggestion that the "true reason" of the principle of the
negotiability of money is "upon account of the currency of it." One
thing is clear: later glosses to the contrary notwithstanding, Mansfield
emphatically did not mean that the rule was based on the fact that
money is an item which frequently passes from person to person. In-
deed, the whole point of Mansfield's opinion was the refutation of the
argument of counsel that the rules for bank notes should be the same
as those for other sorts of frequently transferred property. As Mans-
field puts it: "[t]he whole fallacy of the argument turns upon compar-
ing bank notes to what they do not resemble, and what they ought not
to be compared to, viz. to goods, or to securities, or documents for
debts."so To be sure, in later years some of these forms of property,
e.g., securities, became "negotiable," but at Mansfield's time they
were not, even though securities had been traded in an impersonal
market in London for at least a century before Mansfield's era. Thus
the concept of "currency" used by Mansfield must have been some-
thing different from transferability-something distinctive to money.
The key to Mansfield's concept of "currency" may well lie in a
different interpretation of the "money has no ear-mark" notion. The
suggestion need not be taken quite as literally as Mansfield seems to
have done. To be sure, a specific physical object used as money may
be identifiable, but that is not the same thing as saying that money is
identifiable. The physical object, whether a scrap of paper, a piece of
shiny metal, or a string of beads, functions as money only because we
have decided to treat it as something other than a mere physical
object.8 !
Monetary theory and practice has long distinguished between the
80Id.
81 Two cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court illustrate the point
rather nicely. In Chapman v. Cole, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 141 (1858), a privately minted gold
token from the gold rush days of mid-nineteenth century California had found its way to
Massachusetts. When the rightful owner of the piece brought an action to recover it from one
into whose hands it passed, the court was confronted with the issue of whether the coin was
money, such that the taker prevailed, or just a chattel, such that the rightful owner would
prevail. Displaying the ordinary attitude of proper Yankees to the bizarre practices of Califor-
nians, the court ruled that the fact that people in California treated it as money didn't make it
so. A century later, in the well-known case of Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. I, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962), the Massachusetts court ruled that the
drawer of a group of checks could not maintain an action of conversion against a bank which
had cashed them over forged indorsements, for in the hands of the drawer the checks did not
represent valuable property: "the value of [the drawer's] rights was limited to the physical
paper on which they were written." Id. at 8, 184 N.E.2d at 362.
504 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:471
physical objects used as monetary tokens and money in the sense of an
agreed standard of value. The distinction is perhaps most clear for
units of "money of account" which do not correspond to any actual
coin in circulation. The pound, for example, has been the standard of
money of account in England since Anglo-Saxon times, although no
coin corresponding to a pound was issued until Henry VII's gold sov-
ereigns in 1489. Similarly, the guinea has survived as a unit of ac-
count-perhaps only to baffle foreigners-long after the
disappearance of the coin first minted in 1663 from gold imported by
the African Company's trade with Guinea.82 The distinction between
token and unit is, however, even more basic than the difference be-
tween units that do and do not correspond to coins in circulation. As
soon as coins came to be accepted by tale and not by weight, money
had become an abstraction, not a physical item. Indeed, for most of
history the preeminent concern of those involved in monetary affairs
has been to exploit or prevent the exploitation of the difference be-
tween the coin and the unit: princes debase the coin, moneychangers
clip and cull, and everyone wrings their hands as they do the same.
Thus, when we talk about whether this is my dollar or your dol-
lar, or whether I have ten dollars and you have five dollars, we are not
talking about objects-not even objects of symbolic rather than inher-
ent value. Rather, we are talking about abstract units of account. As
present-day developments in electronic funds transfer systems are
making abundantly clear, there is nothing essential about having
physical objects which represent units of money. We might just as
well have a clerk who stands before a large blackboard on which all of
our names are written and beside which appear tally marks represent-
ing the number of dollars each of us then has. As transactions in
goods or services are made, we would report them to the clerk who
would erase the appropriate number of tally marks from the buyer's
ledger and add the appropriate number to the seller's ledger.
Now let us suppose that Tom sneaks up to the blackboard one
night and erases four marks from Oswald's ledger and adds them to
his ledger. Numerous further transactions might occur in all the ac-
counts before Oswald realizes that his ledger is four marks short.
Tom buys a pair of shoes from Cobbler for four dollars and the clerk
duly erases four marks from Tom's ledger and adds four marks to
Cobbler's ledger; Cobbler buys leather from Tanner for four dollars
and the clerk erases four marks from Cobbler's ledger and adds four
to Tanner's ledger, etc. Suppose that Oswald is somehow able to re-
construct the entire chain of transactions and demonstrate in some
82 See A. Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling 1-2, 46, 97-98 (2d 00. 1963).
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fashion that Barney's ledger is the present resting place of the misdi-
rected four tally marks. Oswald confronts Barney and asserts that he
is the "true owner" of four of the tally marks now on Barney's ledger
on the blackboard. Barney's only appropriate response would be be-
wilderment. To be sure, he might sympathize with Oswald's plight,
he might suggest various schemes for recompense-most likely
against the blackboard clerk-and it is even vaguely possible that he
might be persuaded by some odd sort of fruit of the poisonous tree
argument to agree to compensate Oswald. But one thing that Barney
cannot do, at least without completely abandoning any semblance of
conformity to ordinary language and concepts of property, is to agree
with Oswald's contention that Oswald is the "true owner" of four of
the tally marks on Barney's ledger.
Perhaps, then, both Mansfield and his unnamed interlocutor
were correct. Whether money "has an ear-mark" depends on
whether we take "money" to mean money of account or its physical
tokens. The tangible objects used as representations of money may be
identifiable, but their moneyness, or "currency" to use Mansfield's
phrase, lies in the fact that we have agreed to use them as counters in
a social practice in which the concept of ownership of individual units
makes utterly no sense.
To tie this discussion to the earlier consideration of confusion of
goods and the equity tracing rules, one reason that it makes no sense
for Oswald to assert that he owns the tally marks on Barney's ledger
is that it makes no sense to say that the marks on Barney's ledger are
the same marks as those that were once on Oswald's ledger. The dif-
ference between money and goods is that, as applied to goods, we
have trouble with concepts of individual identity only in aberrant
cases, such as the hypotheticals about grain distilled into whisky or
two cars reassembled from a mixture of their parts. With respect to
money, by contrast, it may never make any sense to ask whether this
is the same dollar that was once elsewhere. The tally marks in the
blackboard hypothetical are no more appropriate objects of property
talk than is the number four or the letter Z.
V. CONCLUSION: ARE SECURITIES EVER TRANSFERRED?
To return to the starting point, how should we think about those
everyday transactions in which Jones sells, and Smith buys, 100
shares of IBM stock? In the modem securities market, it is difficult to
see how most such transactions can be described, other than by arbi-
trary stipulation, as a sale of Jones's 100 shares to Smith. When all
the clearing transactions have been completed, Jones's account with
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her broker shows 100 fewer shares of IBM stock, Smith's account
with her broker shows 100 more shares of IBM stock, and neither of
them really cares what sort of accounting entries have been made on
accounts among brokerages to make the end result come out right.
Even in the simple world of a sale of certificated securities effec-
tuated by delivery of an indorsed stock certificate from seller to buyer,
it is far from clear that the transaction can appropriately be regarded
as the transfer from Jones to Smith of the "same thing." As has been
noted, the way that a buyer of securities in such transactions obtains
assurance of good title is by surrendering the certificate to the issuer
or transfer agent for registration of transfer and issuance of a new
certificate in the name of the buyer. If Smith has done that, does it
really make any sense to say that Smith now owns the same 100
shares of IBM stock that Jones used to own? Before the transaction,
Jones had a right against the issuer to a certain package of rights of
participation in the control, ownership, and earnings of the enterprise.
After the transaction, Jones no longer had that entitlement against the
issuer, but Smith did have an economically equivalent entitlement.
To be sure, the "sale" from Jones to Smith was the efficient cause of
the change from the pretransaction situation where Jones was the
holder of 100 shares to the post transaction situation where Smith was
the holder of 100 shares. Yet the main lesson to be drawn from our
examination of the law of goods is that ownership cannot be reduced
to causation. The bizarre results produced by the equity tracing rules
stand as a warning to anyone who would say that Jones's 100 shares
must be regarded as the same shares formerly owned by Smith merely
because Smith would not have 100 shares but for his dealings with
Jones.
In the end, then, the problem with the present structure of the
law of securities transfers may be that the concept of transferring
items of property just does not fit. It is entirely unnecessary to de-
scribe the result of the Jones-Smith transaction as a "transfer" to
Smith of the same 100 shares that Jones formerly owned. A far more
accurate description would be to say that the Jones-Smith transaction
was the efficient cause of the extinguishment of Jones's rights against
the issuer and creation of a new package of rights in favor of Smith.
That the two packages of rights are economically equivalent does not
mean that they are the same. Indeed, it makes no more sense to say
that the 100 shares Smith now owns are the same ones that Jones used
to own than it does to say that the four tally marks on Barney's ledger
in the blackboard hypothetical are the same tally marks that formerly
were on Oswald's ledger.
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The significance of abandoning the property transfer conceptual
structure becomes apparant when we consider the resolution of'
problems left by the intervention of scalawags, thieves, and insolvents.
Suppose that Tom steals Jones's stock certificate, forges his indorse-
ment and sells the stock to Smith, who succeeds in getting the issuer
to register the transfer. Under present law, the result is that Smith is
entitled to be treated as owner of 100 shares and Jones has a cause of
action against the issuer for wrongful registration.83 Jones's remedy
for that wrong is to have 100 shares reissued in his name. Asking
who got Smith's 100 shares is unnecessary and unhelpful. Ifone must
ask such a question, the best answer is something like the answer that
the North Carolina Supreme Court gave in 1876 when asked what
happened to the owner's tree when it was wrongfully cut and made
into a canoe: "[t]he trespasser by so doing destroys the original arti-
cle, as if he had burned it, and is responsible to the owner, as if he had
burned it."84
The only meaning that we can give to an assertion that someone
"owns 100 shares of IBM stock" is that the person has a right against
the issuer or someone else to be treated as the beneficiary of an undi-
vided loo/x millionth's interest in the equity of IBM, or to be com-
pensated for the value thereof. There is nothing inappropriate about
describing that as a property right, and for some purposes it may be
useful to do so. Yet we should not delude ourselves into thinking that
the rules on transfers of property rights in identifiable physical objects
can provide self-evident answers to the difficult problems that arise
when the person against whom one has a right to be treated as a bene-
ficiary of an undivided interest in the equity of IBM is unable to sat-
isfy all such claims. The concepts of transfers of physical property are
stretched to the limit even when applied to a simple case of sale of
stock from one person to another. It is hardly surprising that the
limits are passed when we confront the complex problems presented
by the insolvency of a securities firm.
The common assumption that money and investment securities
have to be negotiable may contain an important germ of truth, but it
is a very different truth than usually assumed. The point is not that
because money and securities are the kinds of objects which are fre-
quently transferred from person to person, good faith takers must be
protected against prior claims. Rather, the point is that money or
securities are not objects that are transferred from person to person at
all. The lawyers and judges who devised the law of paper money and
83 D.C.C. § 8-311 (1977).
84 Potter v. Mardre, 74 N.C. 36, 40-41 (1876).
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securities centuries ago may well have understood this far better than
•we do today. In an 1817 decision, Justice Story provided as succinct
an explanation as one could want of the theory of transfer of the ar-
chetypal negotiable instrument, a bank note payable to bearer:
A note payable to bearer, is often said to be assignable by delivery;
but in the correct language there is no assignment in the case. It
passes by mere delivery; and the holder never makes any title by or
through any assignment, but claims merely as bearer. The note is
an original promise by the maker to pay any person, who shall
become the bearer. It is, therefore, payable to any and every per-
son, who successively holds the note bona fide, not by virtue of any
assignment of the promise, but by an original and direct promise,
moving from the maker to the bearer.85
What negotiability does is enable us to use physical objects as tokens
of abstract rights without applying the legal concepts that ordinarily
govern rights in physical objects. Saying that one takes the token free
from prior adverse claims to "it," really means that one takes the ab-
stract right, and that what may once have happened to the physical
token is irrelevant. It would, then, be ironic to attempt to preserve
the concept of negotiability once we dispense with the physical
tokens.
85 .Bullard v. Bell, 4 F. Cas. 624, 627 (C.C.D.N.H. 1817) (No. 2,121). Essentially the same
thought can be found as early as the late seventeenth century. In one of the earliest English
cases on a note payable to bearer, the court's explanation of the basis of the bearer's right was
that "when a merchant promises to pay to 'the bearer' of the note, anyone that brings the note
shall be paid." Shelden v. Hentley, 2 Show. 160, 89 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1681).
